However, MyJets is aware of the concern many people may have about single engine planes in general even though turboprops are jet engines behind a propeller and thus have a reliability comparable to a jet plane. 

The choice of the TBM 700 was not solely based on its spaciousness, comfort and cost effectiveness, it was also selected for its exceptional safety records. These safety records are well documented.

Modern aircraft have an enhanced reliability due to their newer design, and state of the art powerplants and avionics.

MyJets management has extensive experience in worldwide flying in all weather conditions of single engine planes and of TBM 700.

This fact alone and  the exceptional safety record of the TBM 700, added to its superior quality of design and manufacturing, make the TBM 700 ideally suited for the kind of missions (less than 500 miles) MyJets is developing.

Socata the manufacturer of the TBM 700 is part of the EADS group who manufactures the Airbus commercial airliners and the Ariane rocket.

The safe operation of an aircraft is dependant on the quality of training of its pilots.

MyJets pilots are all factory trained by Socata representatives in the country MyJets planes fly.

The TBM 700 is a world class turboprop, with an impressive safety record. and many articles have been published over the years in reference to the safety of the three major single turboprops in existence today.

A few basic facts before the articles:

One engine allows landings at lower speed, thus on a shorter runway and with an increased safety. 

The seriousness of a crash is proportionate to the kinetic energy (G force), which increases as the square of the speed.  

A TBM 700, single engine plane, without its engine running, is still flying at 61 Knots (stall speed). At that speed, unless the plane hits a wall straight-on, the plane can stop in less than 50 feet without generating lethal G forces.

An old adage in aviation says: " in a twin, the second engine is here to lead you to the site of the crash" and that is at a much higher speed than with a single. At 71 knots the G force is double than at 50 knots and triple at 87 knots.

Engine failure is rarely the major cause of fatal crashes in single or twin engine planes alike. 

The major cause of crash from small single to wide body airliner is still "pilot error".

In summary, MyJets investors and customers can have confidence in MyJets program and the quality of the aircraft/pilot  teams developed by MyJets. You may contact  Marcel R. Georgi, CEO of MyJets, Inc. at marcel@myjets.net to ask any questions you may have about the attached materials or the MyJets program.

Back to top

A selection of safety related articles follows:

1. "Two Engines Are Better Than One, Right?" by Oliver Sutton;

2. "Single- and twin-turbine accident rates similar" by Gordon Gilbert;  

3. " Single Turboprop Powerplant Aircraft Reliability.

4. "Special Report: Are Jet Charters Safe?" by Pippin Ross.

Two Engines Are Better Than One, Right?

by Oliver Sutton

Following a considerable lobbying effort, under the banner of the Single Engine Turboprop Alliance (SETA), it seems likely that SE commercial IFR operations within Europe will at last become a reality.

This article first appeared in INTERAVIA, BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY No. 634 in September 1999. It is made available on this site by courtesy of the publisher, Aerospace Media Publishing SA. AMP may be contacted through http://www.aerospacemedia.com, or via e-mail

Two engines are better than one. Especially on a dark and dirty night, flying over mountainous territory - right? Well, not always, and certainly not if you take a closer look at the accident statistics. This apparent contradiction looks set to create new opportunities for single-engine utility aircraft manufacturers.

In Europe, JAA regulations OPS 1.525 as currently written prohibit the use of single-engine aircraft for any commercial operations, whether passenger carrying or for cargo flights, at night or in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). This position reflects an ICAO standard, written in 1948 with then-unreliable reciprocating engines firmly in mind, which states that SE aircraft shall only be operated in conditions of weather and light that permit a safe forced landing to be executed in the event of engine failure.

The FAA has a long history of authorising SE IFR and night operations in both reciprocating and turbine-powered aircraft, subject to aircrew training and experience levels. Prior to 1978, operations were authorized in IMC or on top of a ceiling as long as VFR conditions existed below cloud , providing a buffer zone for an eventual forced landing. In 1978 regulations were revised to limit passenger carrying operations in SE aircraft to 15 minutes in IMC after departure, or if unforecasted IMC was encountered. The aircraft also had to be able to descend under VFR if the engine failed. This was generally seen as an unsatisfactory rule.

In May 1998 regulations were further revised to expand SE operating authority, provided additional maintenance and equipment requirements were met. Many factors influenced the decision, including data showing the Cessna C208 Caravan turboprop to have a high level of reliability, Canada's positive experience with SE IFR, and a significant CFIT problem in Alaska, particularly, as a result of continuing VFR flights into deteriorating IMC conditions. In Alaska, pilots were filing for a VFR commercial flight, aiming to stay below, or in the clear on top. Instead, they ran into deteriorating weather conditions, pushed on to gain their crust of bread, and ended their careers as a CFIT statistic. The situation was rightly judged by the authorities as highly dangerous. The expanded SE IFR authority was felt to provide a significantly higher level of safety.

Today there are some 50 countries worldwide that permit SE commercial IFR operations, including a number approving cargo only operations in Europe. The challenge in Europe is to agree a harmonised rule. To this end, in 1995 the JAA set up a working group, which put out an Advance-Notification of Proposed Amendment (A-NPA), suggesting removal of the restriction on SE commercial IFR operations, with a number of additional, and many maintain impractical, operating conditions and minima. AECMA maintains these proposals have been evolved from JAA ETOPS rules applicable to large aircraft, and which are overdemanding.

The original working group discussions and proposals included approval for SE IFR passenger operations, but this important detail appears to have got "lost" in the mists of time. The WG requested comments on the A-NPA from interested parties, including authorities, associations, operators and manufacturers. Their replies have recently become available to INTERAVIA.

In Europe the issue has been an emotive one for years. National certification authorities have been divided into two camps, those that were prepared to approve SE operations, and those that wouldn't consider it at any price. The Scandinavians, and France, went for early approval, but restricted operations to cargo only, while the British CAA, supported by the British Airline Pilots association (BALPA), and the SBAC, remained ferociously opposed. Today the British contingent finds itself in a minority of one.

It is perhaps worth noting that BALPA had been equally ferociously opposed to the concept of ETOPS, where twin-engined airliners carrying hundreds of passengers were expected to fly for up to 180 minutes on one engine following failure of the other engine. Today ETOPS is an every day fact of life. BALPA's case against SE IFR is focused on the possible consequences on the ground of a forced landing at night in highly-populated Europe, the difficulty of executing such a landing, and the need for more detailed research. The UK CAA wants significant enhancements of systems integrity and capability, operational limitations and pilot training before it could reconsider its position. The SBAC position reflects the standpoint of UK-based light twin manufacturer Britten-Norman.

Until recently, other authorities appeared content to follow the ICAO rule, effectively getting themselves off the hook. The pressure for single-engined commercial operations in Europe was minimal, since there was a plentiful supply of late-model piston and turbine twins, and the turbine single had not yet been invented. Today pressures of economics and competition are threatening the survival of small transport and charter operators flying now-elderly twins, and many are looking to the lower operating costs that turbine singles offer. Additionally the supply of good, late-model piston twins has long dried up.

It was just a year ago that we took an in-depth look at two popular utility aircraft , Cessna's hugely successful Caravan workhorse, over 1000 of which are now in service, and the Pilatus PC12 (see INTERAVIA N. 622, July/August 1998, p. 33), which provides close to the performance and capability of a King Air 200 twin turboprop on just one engine. On the subject of the approval of these aircraft for SE commercial IFR operations, we noted the compelling ICAO argument for "a fare-paying passenger to have a right to the same safety level irrespective of what aircraft he is travelling on". And we continued "and that can clearly never be the case in a single-engined aircraft."

We reckon that we are going to be proved wrong. Following a considerable lobbying effort, under the banner of the Single Engine Turboprop Alliance (SETA), set up by manufacturers of single-engined turbine-powered aircraft, including Cessna, Pilatus, Socata and Piper, and other interested parties, the JAA is now forming a new working group to take account of the comments received to the earlier A-NPA and come up with recommendations. With the overwhelming level of support indicated, it seems likely that SE commercial IFR operations across the EU will at last become a reality , at least for cargo flights, initially, to gain confidence levels.

The SETA lobby has built up a convincing case for the doubters, consulting authorities, associations, small operators, distributors and manufacturers across the world in its quest to change a mindset.

According to SETA the justification for SE IFR, at least for cargo initially, lies in three major categories: the Safety case; the Commercial need; and International harmonisation of rules. Wider issues include the approval of the carriage of passengers in IFR, though certain authorities support the carriage of passengers from Day One.

The Safety Case

The SETA proposal considers that the safety target for the operation of SE aircraft at night or in IMC should clearly exceed what has been achieved in recent years with small twins. It then points out that US, Canadian, Australian and other authorities, and the JAA Working Group, have demonstrated the ability to meet this target. Propulsion-related accidents are a minority of total accident , under US FAR 135 operations 1981-1990, 18 percent. The perceived concern of single engine failure is not the most significant contributory cause of accidents. Out of 28 accidents to Caravans, worldwide, in the period 1985-98, no fewer than 14 were due to CFIT. Surely that should be telling something to the pilot licensing, rather than the certification, authorities?

Accident rate per 100,000 flight hours

US FAR 135

Scheduled Service 1981-90 C208

1985-93

NTSB 1979 report

ME piston propulsion All causes related Propulsion related Propulsion related

Accidents 1.21 0.22 0.30 1.70

Fatal Accidents 0.30 0.06 0.07 0.41

In Canada, in operations with 58 Caravans, 14 PC12s and 2 TBM700s and with a fleet total since 1993 of approximately 175,000 hours, there have been two major engine shutdown occurrences , one due to a failure to install a fuel manifold locking plate in which the aircraft made a successful return to the field, while the other involved a forced landing in which there were no fatalities.

The Australian CAA study concluded that the single turbine was at least as safe as the piston twin in regard to engine-failure related accidents, and also stated that "forced landings at night are not necessarily as hazardous as might be expected and are mostly survivable: the fatal accident rate at night, while higher than by day, is only about 8 percent." The Australian CAA concluded that the probability of a fatal accident due to engine failure on a single-engined turbine aircraft was 0.07 per 100,000 hours, compared to "the best performing piston twins" rate of 0.15 per 100,000 hours. That says you're at least twice as safe in a turbine single as in a piston twin.

UK CAA analysis of fatal accidents to aircraft of less than 5,700kg (12,500lb) on both private and commercial operations from 1985 to 1994 showed only 6 out of 166 (3.6 percent) were due to engine stoppage. The UK data included 4 fatals to light twins due to loss of control following engine failure or asymmetric power, compared to 9 fatals in single-engined aircraft, based on a sample of 8 million flight hours. Taking into account the probable number of hours of single and twin-engined aircraft in the sample, this indicates a far higher frequency of powerplant-related fatal accidents on twins than singles; (there are 7,500 singles on the UK register compared to 350 light twins).

Analysis by Robert E. Breiling associates for Pilatus Aircraft concluded that piston-engined general aviation aircraft were involved in 2.86 times more accidents than turboprop aircraft per 100,000 flight hours, when considering all causes.

The Swedish CAA study of the mid-1980s concluded that the fatal accident rate for single-turboprops, due to engine failure, was estimated at 0.13 per 100,000 flight hours. The study concluded that operations with SE turboprops are comparable with other commercial operations.

Cessna C208 Caravan fatals in the USA, 1985-1996 (2.6 million flight hours), were 0.56 per 100,000 hours; fatal accidents due to mechanical failures of the engine were zero. Of the five non-fatal accidents involving engine failure or shutdown, three occurred in 1990 and 1991 due to oil loss, because the oil cap was left off or improperly installed; a modification has been introduced to prevent such an occurrence. The remaining two were actual engine mechanical failures (scavenge pump and gas producer turbine failures).

Contrary to what one might imagine, 21.3 percent of accidents, and 20 percent of fatals in twin piston-engined aircraft in US operations occurred following engine malfunction or failure. In these cases, the accident occurred even though one engine was still functioning normally , indicating that the pilot was unable to control the aircraft following the engine problem.

The SETA SE IFR proposals include requirements for enhanced onboard systems and equipment, to make the pilot's job easier, better maintenance programmes as well as operational limitations. Extra systems include dual electrical power supplies, an emergency electrical supply, two attitude indicators and engine health and usage monitoring. Crew training beyond that required for today's twin licences is also suggested. Although the regulations do not require it, some Norwegian operators have a policy of a two-pilot crew for SE IFR, which would appear to be an eminently sensible, if costly, solution.

A further argument in favour of the single engined aircraft is its low stalling speed of 61 knots, imposed by long-standing certification regulations, which ensures a low touchdown speed, short ground run, and better survival probability in case of a forced landing.

Commercial need

Light piston twins designed in the 1960s and 70s are reaching the end of their safe working lives. Many operators make the point that performance of these aircraft on one engine at MGTOW has always been marginal; in difficult weather conditions, or at night, following engine failure, a high degree of piloting skill may be required to survive. Certain designs of the period had very limited, or even negative, climb capabilities on one engine. Systems, autopilots and avionics have become unreliable, and designed to lower standards than would be acceptable today, particularly in safety-critical areas; parts are hard to get and expensive, and safety-related repairs are far more frequently needed.

There is a compelling safety and economic case to replace the old clunkers with modern and reliable designs, represented by the new generation of turbine-powered singles. As one operator puts it: "we continue to fly on recycled junk." The market replacement need in Europe alone is huge, and could be served by Europe-based manufacturers Pilatus and Socata, to the benefit of the European aerospace industry, and by US-based Cessna and Piper. Undoubtedly, following operating approval, other designs would enter the market, further stimulating the general aviation sector.

Small outlying communities worldwide are coming to rely on air services for supplies, medical and other vital services, which today are provided at considerably higher risk levels by outdated piston twins. Is this really the intention of authorities that oppose approval of SE IFR operations? The SE turboprop would provide a higher level of safety and reliability, and be more economic to operate. As experience levels build up, reliability of the SE turboprop is likely to further increase.

Harmonisation of rules

The FAA and JAA agree on the need to harmonise regulations to create a consistently safe, seamless, worldwide transportation system. Clearly it is unsatisfactory for a tourist, for example, to take an IFR flight in a SE turboprop to a remote holiday destination, and then learn that such operations are considered unsafe by his home authority. This is the situation today.

There appears to be a misconception, notes the SETA document, that SE IFR is fine in the USA because the terrain and weather conditions are much more forgiving than in Europe. This conception is totally false, and in fact the weather in the US is far worse than in Europe in many areas. There are also numerous mountain ranges in the US, while population densities in the USA in many areas are similar to Europe.

Concern about little aeroplanes falling on people's heads are equally unfounded , after all there are over 7,000 privately-owned singles in congested Germany alone, which can and do fly practically everywhere in IFR and VFR conditions, and they do not fall on people's heads.

Experience in the USA, and elsewhere, has demonstrated that SE IFR in turboprop aircraft is safe. The bottom line is that a multi-engine piston operator has a higher probability of accident and fatality compared to the single turbine operator. This alone is reason enough to approve single turbine commercial IFR operations , for both passenger and cargo flights.

SIDE STORY: Engine Condition Trend Monitoring

ECTM, developed by Pratt & Whitney Canada, is essentially a three part process:

1. In-flight data may be gathered by the pilot or by an automatic recorder. Accuracy of the data is dependent upon the accuracy of the readings taken and recorded. Data includes compressor speed, torque, IAS, prop speed, inter-turbine temperature, fuel flow, indicated outside air temperature and pressure altitude.

2. The data is mathematically converted to ISA conditions SL, and compared to a mominal engine model to produce deltas, which can be viewed on screen or printed.

3. Analysis of the trends forms the basis for the "on-condition HSI" concept of hot section inspections, and for other maintenance.

The use of ECTM will increase safety, decrease HSI cost, reduce down time and minimize flight aborts, maintains Danish Engine Trend Analyzing (DETA), which currently "keeps an eye on the trend" of some 25 aircraft. Engines covered include the PT6, PW100, PW300, PW500 and the JT15D series.  

Back to top  

Single- and twin-turbine accident rates similar

by Gordon Gilbert

In the aftermath of July's well publicized engine-out ditching of a Pilatus PC-12 in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Russia, industry observers are asking how this and other recent accidents have affected the statistical reliability of single-engine turboprops and if sales of these aircraft are suffering.

Although production-built single-turbine airplanes used for business flying typically do not have the same speed, load capability or systems redundancy as twin-turbine airplanes, they have amassed a comparable safety record, according to statistics through last year compiled by accident analyst firm Robert E. Breiling Associates of Boca Raton, Fla.

Breiling reports U.S. turboprop-singles have had 1.99 total accidents and 0.80 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hr compared with 2.37 and 0.83, respectively, for U.S.-registered turboprop twins. These figures cover the period from initial aircraft certification through last year. Last year the statistical reliability of single-engine turboprops was even played up by Pilatus in its marketing of the PC-12.

While accident rate statistics seem to back up that claim, the actual number of single-engine turboprop accidents is increasing as the fleet gets larger. This year to date, the NTSB reports that there have been 10 accidents, five of them fatal, involving four production-certified single-engine turboprops: the Cessna 208 Caravan, Piper PA-46-500TP Meridian, Socata TBM 700 and Pilatus PC-12.

Nine of the 10 accidents are still under investigation, seven of the accidents were in Cessna 208s (by far the most numerous of all turboprop singles, with close to 1,300 in operation), and engine failure has definitely been determined as a factor in four accidents, (April 26, July 6, July 8 and July 10) none causing critical injuries. The Safety Board determined the January 31 crash of the Cessna 208 on floats was caused when the airplane hit a swell during a water landing. All production turboprop singles are powered by the Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6 series.

Engine Problems

A Caravan flying for FedEx made a forced landing April 26 after an engine failure. The pilot (not injured in the accident) said that during climbout the airplane's engine "spooled down, slowly and smoothly, like a loss of torque or the propeller going to feather." Later, an examination of data from the power analyzer recorder system revealed that during the most recent takeoff the engine exceeded its torque limit of 1,980 ft lb for 99 seconds. The peak torque value over that duration was 2,649 ft lb.

On July 6, a Caravan on a repositioning flight operated by Maxfly Aviation ditched into the Atlantic Ocean 20 mi east of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., following loss of engine power. According to the pilot (who was not hurt), the airplane was cruising at 6,500 ft when the engine lost power and came to a "screeching halt." The propeller made a "chow, chow, chow" noise, turned three times, stopped and feathered.

In the July 8 PC-12 ditching, the pilot reported that the airplane was in cruise at 26,500 ft when he felt a vibration followed by a rapid increase in the engine's turbine temperature indication (TTI). He reported that the TTI reached 1,144 deg C, at which point there was a compressor stall. He shut down the engine, feathered the propeller and entered a power-off emergency descent. After spending 15 hr in a life raft, the pilot and all three passengers were safely recovered some 60 mi from the Russian coast in the icy Sea of Okhotsk.

Two days later, on July 10, a Cessna 208 of Bolivian registration (CP-2395), was substantially damaged during a forced landing following a loss of engine power during climbout from the La Paz International Airport in Bolivia. The pilot, the copilot and 11 passengers were injured. The flight crew reported a loss of engine power approximately six minutes after takeoff.

In the U.S., more than 70 percent of PC-12 sales are to owner-pilots for personal and business flying. As might be expected, just the opposite is true for the Caravan, where 70 percent of its users are small package commercial operators, according to director of Caravan sales for Cessna John Doman. "In our experience with the Caravan,which has more than 15 years of service under its belt, flying in all sorts of different conditions,it has established an enviable safety record. The PT6 is a legendary powerplant in terms of reliability. So our reaction from the marketplace is one of acceptance of the safety inherent in the turbine single."

A lot of Caravan air-freight customers are moving up from piston twins such as Beech 18s, Queen Airs, Navajos and Cessna 402s. "Statistics and just common knowledge tell you that a single-turbine airplane is going to be a safer, more reliable piece of machinery than the piston twin," Doman said.

Doman said Cessna does not actively market the Caravan to the U.S. air-taxi industry. He described that position as a "corporate decision," not based on any accident or incident history. The airplane by regulation is permitted to fly air taxi, including carrying fare-paying passengers in IMC, but Doman said Cessna over the years has become "very sensitive" to product liability in the U.S.

There are many air-taxi Caravans in operation outside the U.S., "But if someone were to come to us for a new Caravan for flying paying passengers between Chicago and Minneapolis, we would respectfully decline the sale." Overseas, however, Cessna encourages sales to this market. And that market potential is just waiting for some promised rulemaking relief.

For the last five years Cessna has been working with other airframe manufacturers as a member of the Single Engine Turbine Alliance (SETA) to get the JAA to change the requirements in Europe to allow single-turbine IFR commercial operations. Such operations are currently prohibited for both carrying cargo and fare-paying passengers. "We think that the way things are headed, we should see a change by perhaps the end of this year," Doman said.

A spokesman for Piper Aircraft in Vero Beach, Fla., echoed the statements on the quality, excellence, reliability and safety perceived by prospective and new owners of single turboprop airplanes. Indeed, P&WC statistics show the time between unplanned removals for the PT6 family as occurring once in every 142,817.14 hr and the time between in-flight shutdowns to be one in every 250,000 hr.

Aviation International News is a publication of The Convention News Co., Inc., P.O. Box 277, Midland Park, NJ, 07432. Copyright 2001. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission from The Convention News Co., Inc., is strictly prohibited. The Convention News Co., Inc., also publishes NBAA Convention News, HAI Convention News, EBACE Convention News, Paris 2003, Dubai 2001, Asian Aerospace 2002, Farnborough 2002, AIN Reports and AIN News Alerts.

Back to top

The following safety information is summarized from the contents of a report prepared by:

ROBERT E. BREILING ASSOCIATES, INC.

765 N.E. 35th Street, Suite B

Boca Raton, FL 33431

(561) 338-6900

SINGLE TURBOPROP POWERPLANT AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY

For PILATUS BUSINESS AIRCRAFT LTD.

August 2000

Summary/Findings

Powerplant Reliability Comparative Data - Five Year Average. 1992-1996 (Data is based on the latest information available from NTSB and FAA sources). 

Accidents per 100,000 hours by major aircraft type, 5 year average 1992-1996 

Single engine reciprocating powered aircraft 9.26 

Multi-engine reciprocating powered aircraft 5.68 

Multi-engine turboprop powered aircraft 4.34 

Single engine turboprop aircraft 1.46 

Percent of general aviation fixed wing aircraft accidents attributed to power loss - all causes - 5 year average, 1992-1996

Single engine reciprocating powered aircraft 33.5%

Multi-engine reciprocating powered aircraft 27.6%

Multi-engine turboprop powered aircraft 8.0%

Single engine turboprop aircraft 0%

Percent of general aviation fixed wing aircraft accidents attributed to power loss due to mechanical, maintenance, design, manufacturer causes

Single engine reciprocating powered aircraft 14.4% 

Multi-engine reciprocating powered aircraft 8.9%

Multi-engine turboprop powered aircraft 4.0% 

Single engine turboprop aircraft 0%

Accidents per 100,000 hours due to power loss for mechanical/maintenance/design/manufacturer (based on Commercial and Air Carrier operation data compiled by the FAA)

Single engine reciprocating powered aircraft 1.33

Multi-engine reciprocating powered aircraft 0.51

Multi-engine turboprop powered aircraft 0.17 

S/E turboprop aircraft excluding agricultural aircraft 0

Powerplant shutdowns per 1,000 hours (Commercial/Air Carrier data) Average of selected powerplants, 1997

Reciprocating powerplant average 0.208

Turboprop powerplant average 0.041

Selected Aircraft Accident Analysis - Certification through 1999 - U.S. Fleet

Piper Malibu(sic) Cessna Caravan Socata TBM700 Pilatus PC-12

Certification Date 1983 1984 1988 1994

U.S. Fleet Size 749 821 74 133

Accidents 79 59 5 1

Fatal Accidents 25 27 1 0

Accidents due to

powerplant

malfunction / failure 14 2 0 0

Cumulative flight

hours 1,100,150 3,145,272 161,406 134,234

Accident rate

per 100,000 hrs. 7.18 1.88 3.10 0.74

Fatal Accident rate

per 100,000 hrs. 2.27 0.86 0.62 0

Power loss accident rate

per 100,000 hrs. 1.27 0.064 0 0

*1 non-U.S. registered PC-12 experienced an accident due to powerplant loss due to mechanical malfunction / failure

 Conclusions:

Based on the review and analysis of accident data involving multi and single reciprocating and turboprop powerplant malfunction / failure accidents and analysis of the various powerplant reliability data available, a single turboprop powered aircraft, with adequate backup systems provided in it's design, will be more reliable, involved in fewer powerplant malfunction / failure related accidents than that of single or multi reciprocating powered fixed wing aircraft and comparable to the reliability of a multi-turboprop powered aircraft. 

Back to top

Special Report: Are Jet Charters Safe?

by Pippin Ross

Illustration: Anastasia Vasilakis

A year after Payne Stewart's death, professional and amateur golfers alike are still chartering jets in record numbers, mostly without a true sense of the potential dangers. In this special investigation, T&LGolf uncovers some frightening facts about the industry and some sensible ways to help you ensure that your flight is a safe one.

On the cloudless morning of October 25, 1999, two-time U.S. Open champion Payne Stewart, his agents Robert Fraley and Van Ardan, and golf course designer Bruce Borland boarded a chartered Learjet 35 for what promised to be a routine flight between Orlando International Airport and Dallas Love Field. In less time than it takes a foursome to play a few long holes, Stewart's trip turned into a nationally televised tragedy.

Just twenty-five minutes after takeoff, air-traffic control lost radio contact with Sunjet Aviation pilot Michael Kling and copilot Stephanie Bellegarrigue. With Air Force chase planes in close but helpless pursuit, the Lear continued flying for more than 1,400 miles until it ran out of fuel and plunged into a field near Mina, South Dakota. Among the few recoverable remains: Stewart's wedding ring and a few badly mangled golf clubs.

If one of the world's most famous golfers hadn't been on board, it is likely that few people would recall the chilling details of Stewart's fatal ride just over one year ago. In the cacophony of tragic global events, accidents even fatal accidents involving private jets, small planes and helicopters now rarely make more than the local news, unless they involve a celebrity, such as Stewart or John F. Kennedy Jr. As a result, the safety issues involved have passed under the radar screens of both the media and the public.

But consider: On the day Payne Stewart died, four other planes crashed. In the same month, forty-two people died in 156 accidents involving small jets, planes and helicopters in the skies over the continental United States. Stewart's tragedy was just one of 2,049 accidents investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in 1999; just fifty-two of those involved commercial airlines. While the accident rate for charters had been falling in recent years, through July 2000, air-charter crashes already claimed more lives than in all of 1999.

The air-charter industry is in the throes of unprecedented growth and golfers are among its top clients. These days, up to one-fourth of the field in some PGA Tour events arrives by private aircraft. A select few such as Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus and Greg Norman even have their own planes. And many golfers such as Tiger Woods now participate in hugely popular "fractional ownership" programs, which permit them to time-share aircraft in much the same way they might time-share a condominium. The Stewart tragedy, however, is causing some of them to rethink their travel plans. For example, Tom Lehman now flies commercial ninety percent of the time at his wife's behest. "She doesn't want me to fly on chartered planes unless we know the plane and we know who's flying it" he told T&L Golf. "We have three children, and I respect her wishes."

But it's not just the pros who are chartering planes. The nation's twenty-five million amateur golfers provide one of the biggest and most lucrative customer bases for the air-charter industry. Thanks to the rollicking U.S. economy, demand for charter service has soared by more than seventy percent since 1995; fractional ownership has grown even faster. There are more private planes in the skies today than ever before. Not surprisingly, during last year's Masters, air traffic around Augusta Regional Airport at Bush Field tripled.

Along with hiring aircraft for corporate outings and trips to major championships, more and more recreational golfers are chartering small planes and choppers to reach the courses of their dreams, especially tracks in remote locations such as Bandon Dunes in Oregon. There's even a charter company that markets itself exclusively to golfers. Called Jet-Golf, it sells "the amazing experience of course-hopping in luxurious style."

We may never know exactly why Payne Stewart's chartered plane went down. Government agencies including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NTSB and FBI are continuing to investigate the accident and the operations of Sunjet Aviation. Theories on the causes of the crash range from a sudden loss of cabin pressure (possibly caused by a faulty oxygen valve) to pilot error and maintenance lapses on the part of Sunjet which has steadfastly denied any wrongdoing. But the force of Stewart's crash has made it almost impossible for investigators to reconstruct with certainty the deadly chain of events that caused the wreck.

As a result, the most important legacy of the Stewart tragedy may be in drawing attention to the safety issues involving the air-charter industry and certain types of operators in particular. T&L Golf has conducted an in-depth inquiry that included interviews with charter operators, pilots, mechanics, industry analysts, consumer advocates and government air-safety officials. Among our findings:

o Overall, the accident rate for all charters is nine times higher than it is for commercial airlines.

o Some unscrupulous operators are cutting corners on expensive safety and maintenance procedures and pushing pilots and planes to the limit.

o The FAA is overwhelmed, making self-regulation even more critical.

o The NTSB lacks the manpower to thoroughly investigate crashes.

o A bitter political battle between air-charter and fractional-ownership companies has led to the loosening of some landing restrictions.

o The air-charter boom has spawned a subclass of "cockroach charters" which evade regulatory supervision.

o There is a brisk black market in illegal used and counterfeit aircraft parts that poses a serious safety risk.

o Nonetheless, there is a way to weed out the unreliable services and select a safe charter company if you know the right questions to ask.

VETERAN PILOTS ARE FOND OF

spouting the cheery wisdom that flying is safer than driving; if you're going to crash, they say, it'll be in your car on the way to the airport. And indeed, it is true that, by any statistical measure, flying is generally safe. In 1999, charter services experienced fewer than three accidents for every 100,000 flight hours. This means that you could be flying nonstop twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week for over four years before you'd be due for a wreck.

But what's also clear is that the hazards involved in chartering a plane vary widely. While flying with the very best operators may well be as safe as riding a scheduled commercial airline, the accident rate for charters overall is about nine times higher. And like any booming industry, the charter business has drawn its share of slipshod operators. Although federal regulators are charged with assuring air safety, the truth is that customers are wise to make sure for themselves that they're riding a good plane, flown by experienced pilots and maintained by a responsible operator.

For a passenger, this can be tricky. Sunjet Aviation, for example the operator for Stewart's crash had all the trappings of a first-class operation. It operated out of a new $2 million terminal near Orlando, elegantly finished in green marble and mahogany. It had an elite clientele including golfers Nick Faldo and Corey Pavin and celebrities like Matt Damon and Van Halen. And it flew the popular Learjet 35, a gleaming, fast eight seater with a sumptuous beige leather interior. The company commanded top rates a flight from Orlando to Dallas went for $1,625 an hour and it had never experienced a fatal accident.

Although Payne Stewart owned a piece of a time-share jet a slice of the business with an impeccable safety record he was flying Sunjet on this trip because his agents' staff had made the arrangements. There was much he did not know about the Learjet 35 as he boarded. For one thing, the plane had just had an oxygen valve replaced a procedure that requires extensive manipulation of an assortment of switches and valves. It is unclear how thoroughly the plane had been flight-tested after the repair.

For another, while pilot Michael Kling was a high-altitude specialist in the Air Force before entering the charter business, he had only seventy hours of experience piloting a Lear and had received certification to fly the airplane just four days earlier. And the Lear is notoriously rife with design idiosyncrasies, prompting one FAA inspector to call it a "very slippery jet" to fly. Even Dave Franson, a spokesman for Bombardier, the Learjet's manufacturer, admits that the plane's design is "quirky." "All pilots know that every airplane has idiosyncrasies" he says. "No pilot worth his or her stuff flies an airplane different from the one they're used to without first learning its nuances." Over the past thirty years, there have been just six fatal accidents in which cabin depressurization was the suspected cause; three have involved Learjets. In 1995, the FAA ordered inspections and, if deemed necessary, preventative repairs to be made to eight different models of Learjet including Stewart's ill-fated craft. But Ted Lopatkiewicz, an NTSB spokesman, said, "It's not clear from our investigation if that maintenance was ever performed."

It would also later turn out that the twenty-three-year-old jet hadn't been factory-serviced in twenty-one years. Although there is no federal requirement for such upkeep, many charter companies and all of the country's top four air-share outfits do it annually anyway, since it provides an extra measure of safety. Kevin Russell, senior vice president of air-share giant Executive Jet, explains: "It's like getting your car serviced at the factory dealer. You can go to our local mechanic because he's cheap and nice, but you're not going to get as thorough maintenance and quality repair."

Todd Curtis, an aviation consumer advocate and former Boeing engineer, says economic considerations provide powerful incentives for unscrupulous operators to cut corners. While a well-maintained aircraft can last a long time, says Curtis, "it's common to ignore a ping or a pop until it begins to actually affect flight." And letting such pings and pops accumulate can be deadly. "Every aviation disaster," Curtis notes, "is a series of small things that conspire to make something big and bad happen."

IT IS, OF COURSE, THE FAA'S JOB

to make sure the skies are safe. To that end, the agency imposes a web of rules and regulations governing how planes are flown and maintained. The strictest requirements and most extensive inspections govern scheduled commercial airlines. A slightly less demanding set applies to small commuter operations and "on-demand" air charters such as Sunjet. Air shares are subject to less-stringent rules that apply to privately owned jets, planes and helicopters, all of which will soon have to meet stiffer standards.

But the simple truth is that the FAA is overwhelmed. "The combination of deregulation and an economic boom that's making everyone want their own airplane has put the FAA into triage mode" says Curtis, who operates a web site on aviation safety (www.airsafe.com) that includes a ghoulish list of more than 120 celebrities killed in plane crashes since 1910. (The list includes Tony Lema but not Davis Love Jr., both of whom died in chartered aircraft.) "Two hundred and sixty-five thousand airplanes take off and land every day. There are three thousand FAA inspectors."

DAVIS LOVE III, whose father died in a charter crash, cites pilot experience as a major concern. "It's just like you don't want to be riding in a car with a seventeen-year-old who's just gotten his driver's license," he says.

In fact, the FAA admits it is besieged. Following the Alaska Airlines tragedy in 1999, the agency acknowledged that some wrecks might have been caused because it lacks the manpower to follow up on the safety violations that have been uncovered. "There's an expectation that the aviation community will regulate itself and by and large, it does," says former NTSB vice chair Robert Francis, who investigated the Stewart crash. "I'm not saying that the FAA isn't regulating the charter business and general aviation it is. But there's got to be a degree of individual responsibility."

Indeed, air shares, which have operated under the more relaxed rules than those for charters, actually have a better safety record in large part because they use new planes and operate under high self-imposed maintenance and pilot standards. But in an effort to placate charter operators struggling to compete with the popular fractional companies, the FAA has actually loosened rules on where charter planes can land.

And the FAA is not the only piece of the government safety net that has holes: A recent seventy-page RAND Corporation study on the NTSB whose crash investigations produce recommendations that play a key part in avoiding future disasters  describes the agency's staff and facilities as "stretched to the limit."

What all this means, of course, is that planes are only as safe as the people who maintain and fly them and the Stewart tragedy has driven that point home to many pro golfers. "It's on everybody's mind, both pilots and passengers," says Ben Crenshaw.

But many pros continue to use charters and air shares regularly. The appeal is understandable: Small jets fly you directly where you want to go in comfort, style and privacy. There are seven hundred airports in the country where commercial airliners are certified to land (and only 350 of them currently are used for such flights); smaller charters can fly into more than 5,000 airstrips. There are also none of the commercial-flight delays. Among professional golfers, who fly constantly, air shares have become particularly popular. Such pros will pay, say, around $100,000 a year on top of a $400,000 down payment for one- sixteenth ownership of a jet. This sum buys them access to a jet for a set amount of time, typically fifty to one hundred hours a year. And it's a deductible business expense, of course.

Davis Love III, whose father died in a charter crash, owns a share of a Hawker 1000 corporate jet. He says he has always made a point of being careful about his planes and pilots. "The age of the fleet and the experience of the pilots are the main things you have to consider," says Love. "It's just like you don't want to be riding in a car with a seventeen-year-old who's just gotten his driver's license. The likelihood of what happened to Payne is small, but it's even smaller with new equipment and experienced pilots."

Indeed, experts warn that charters also may pose special risks because pilots may be unfamiliar with what they are flying "less connected to the airplane," as one puts it. Part of the problem is that many charter companies (including Sunjet) operate aircraft owned by wealthy individuals or companies under leaseback provisions. Or they may use jets leased from aircraft brokers located across the country. As a result, they'll be unfamiliar with those critical early hints of mechanical trouble or how the plane's been maintained. Airplanes taken out of service for discretionary maintenance can produce havoc on the bottom line both from the cost of performing the safety procedures and from the lost revenue that results from the down time. This provides a powerful incentive for operators to keep their expensive equipment in the air.

ULTIMATELY, A CHARTER PILOT,

At risk himself, has the best incentive to make sure a plane is safe. But not every pilot is a model citizen. Some get off on risk; others are overworked, or facing financial pressures to fly when they or the plane isn't in top shape. JFK Jr.'s fatal flight is often held up as an example of the risk of the aviation boom. "He didn't break a law," notes Curtis. "He was just a rich, stubborn guy with a new airplane he wasn't well acquainted with.... Those are the people who crash and kill themselves and their passengers all the time." Although Kennedy's ill- advised nocturnal flight didn't involve paying customers, there is a message for charter passengers in his tragedy: Pilot experience really matters.

A recent study by Robert E. Breiling Associates, Inc. compared the ratio of accidents to hours spent in the cockpit. Pilots with less than fifty hours in a single-engine plane and jet pilots with fewer than 250 hours flying a particular aircraft had seventy-five percent more accidents than more experienced pilots. "Driving is analogous to aviation," insists former NTSB vice chair Francis. "For the worst reasons. Sometimes people run red lights. You probably do. Sometimes people make an illegal U-turn. You probably do. Mostly you get away with it. If not, one of two things happens: You get nailed by a cop; or worse, you get hurt or killed, or you hurt or kill someone. It's the same in flying."

Another type of pilot charter customers should avoid is the general-aviation type who seeks to recruit paying passengers at airport terminals, bending an FAA rule that allows a private pilot to "split costs" with a passenger. With such renegade charters, who operate on the expectation that the undermanned FAA will never catch up with them, all bets are off. Aviation safety consultant Robert Breiling calls them "cockroach charters." And because the process of becoming an FAA-sanctioned charter service is time-consuming, arduous and expensive, some even skirt scrutiny by paying to "borrow" someone else's charter license a perfectly legal process.

There is another safety hazard that can slip past charter operators: a lucrative black market in used and substandard airplane parts that are pirated off demolished or decrepit planes and sold to mechanics and manufacturers as the real thing. These "Suspected Unapproved Aircraft Parts" (called SUPS) pose a real hazard. During the 1990s, the Department of Transportation nabbed 479 SUPS dealers and leveled $65 million in fines. Between 1973 and 1996, the FAA reports SUPS played a role in 174 crashes and seventeen deaths. Not one of those crashes involved a commercial airline. Responding to the problem, Congress earlier this year stiffened the criminal penalties for trafficking in substandard parts.

For all of these reasons, notes safety consultant Breiling, "it behooves people who are chartering to really check into who they're using." A large, established operator; experienced pilots with plenty of time in the cockpit of the plane they're flying; regular pilot retraining; preventative aircraft maintenance, with spare parts purchased from reputable shops all of it helps assure that the odds on charter safety will remain heavily tilted in your favor (see "Chartering a Jet: Ten Questions to Always Ask," below).

"The good ones are as safe as the scheduled airlines," notes Breiling. "The bad ones have the accidents."

CHARTERING A JET: TEN QUESTIONS TO ALWAYS ASK

When chartering a plane, don't hesitate to be inquisitive. If you demonstrate your safety savvy, a charter is more likely to put you in their best airplane with their best pilots. Steer clear of services where your inquiries are met with evasion or hostility. Always ask the following ten questions. For detailed information on charters and their safety records, go to www.ntsb.gov or www.airsafe.com.

1. What is your FAA certificate number? Any aircraft that carries paying passengers must be FAA certified under "part 135" or "121" regulations. Make sure your carrier isn't using a "borrowed" certificate perfectly legal under FAA rules, but a clear warning sign. Contact the local FAA Flight Standards District Office to verify.

2. Where do your airplanes come from? Charters that own or lease their aircraft are preferable to charter brokerage houses and online companies that hire whatever planes they can find. 

3. Who maintains your aircraft? The answer should be one FAA- authorized maintenance shop, not several. 

4. How often do your planes go in for servicing? The plane should receive annual maintenance from a manufacturer-approved repair shop. It's more expensive, but thorough and state-of-the-art. 

5. What sort of training do your pilots receive? Pilots-in-command should receive training every six months at one of the country's flight-simulator schools. Be wary of in-house training. It may not be as sophisticated, and may have been rushed or skipped altogether. 

6. How many flight hours has the pilot had in the selected aircraft type, and how "current" is he or she? Look for at least 250 hours for jets, 100 hours for smaller aircraft. Pilots should also have done three takeoffs and landings in that type of plane within ninety days. 

7. What's your insurance company, and what sorts of requirements do they have? Big insurers such as United States Aviation Insurance Group require pilot training and mechanical inspections that go above and beyond FAA standards. 

8. What's your safety record? A good service can have a minor accident or two. If it's had more or a major wreck look elsewhere. 

9. Have you ever been fined or written up by the FAA? If so, for what? Citations for safety, maintenance or pilot-training lapses are clear red flags.

10. What's the weather? If there's less than a half mile of visibility or the ceiling is lower than two hundred feet, don't go  

Back to top