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The TBM 700, MyJets and the Safety of Single Engine Turbo-Props
However, MyJets is aware of the concern many people may have about single engine planes in general even though turboprops are jet engines behind a propeller and thus have a reliability comparable to a jet plane. The choice of the TBM 700 was not solely based on its spaciousness, comfort and cost effectiveness, it was also selected for its exceptional safety records. These safety records are well documented. Modern aircraft have an enhanced reliability due to their newer design, and state of the art powerplants and avionics. MyJets management has extensive experience in worldwide flying in all weather conditions of single engine planes and of TBM 700. This fact alone and the exceptional safety record of the TBM 700, added to its superior quality of design and manufacturing, make the TBM 700 ideally suited for the kind of missions (less than 500 miles) MyJets is developing. Socata the manufacturer of the TBM 700 is part of the EADS group who manufactures the Airbus commercial airliners and the Ariane rocket. The safe operation of an aircraft is dependant on the quality of training of its pilots. MyJets pilots are all factory trained by Socata representatives in the country MyJets planes fly.
The TBM 700 is a world class turboprop, with an impressive safety record. and many articles have been published over the years in reference to the safety of the three major single turboprops in existence today. A few basic facts before the articles:
One engine allows landings at lower speed, thus on a shorter runway and with an increased safety. The seriousness of a crash is proportionate to the kinetic energy (G force), which increases as the square of the speed. A TBM 700, single engine plane, without its engine running, is still flying at 61 Knots (stall speed). At that speed, unless the plane hits a wall straight-on, the plane can stop in less than 50 feet without generating lethal G forces. An old adage in aviation says: " in a twin, the second engine is here to lead you to the site of the crash" and that is at a much higher speed than with a single. At 71 knots the G force is double than at 50 knots and triple at 87 knots. Engine failure is rarely the major cause of fatal crashes in single or twin engine planes alike. The major cause of crash from small single to wide body airliner is still "pilot error".
In
summary, MyJets
investors and customers can have confidence in MyJets
program and the quality of the aircraft/pilot teams developed by MyJets. You may contact Marcel R. Georgi, CEO of MyJets,
Inc. at marcel@myjets.net to ask any questions you may have about the
attached materials or the MyJets
program.
A
selection of safety related articles follows: 1.
"Two Engines Are Better Than One, Right?" by Oliver Sutton; 2.
"Single- and twin-turbine accident rates similar" by Gordon
Gilbert; 3.
" Single Turboprop Powerplant Aircraft Reliability.
Two
Engines Are Better Than One, Right? by
Oliver Sutton Following
a considerable lobbying effort, under the banner of the Single Engine
Turboprop Alliance (SETA), it seems likely that SE commercial IFR
operations within Europe will at last become a reality. This
article first appeared in INTERAVIA, BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY No. 634 in
September 1999. It is made available on this site by courtesy of the
publisher, Aerospace Media Publishing SA. AMP may be contacted through
http://www.aerospacemedia.com, or via e-mail Two
engines are better than one. Especially on a dark and dirty night, flying
over mountainous territory - right? Well, not always, and certainly not if
you take a closer look at the accident statistics. This apparent
contradiction looks set to create new opportunities for single-engine
utility aircraft manufacturers. In
Europe, JAA regulations OPS 1.525 as currently written prohibit the use of
single-engine aircraft for any commercial operations, whether passenger
carrying or for cargo flights, at night or in Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC). This position reflects an ICAO standard, written in 1948
with then-unreliable reciprocating engines firmly in mind, which states
that SE aircraft shall only be operated in conditions of weather and light
that permit a safe forced landing to be executed in the event of engine
failure. The
FAA has a long history of authorising SE IFR and night operations in both
reciprocating and turbine-powered aircraft, subject to aircrew training
and experience levels. Prior to 1978, operations were authorized in IMC or
on top of a ceiling as long as VFR conditions existed below cloud , providing a buffer zone for an eventual forced landing. In 1978
regulations were revised to limit passenger carrying operations in SE
aircraft to 15 minutes in IMC after departure, or if unforecasted IMC was
encountered. The aircraft also had to be able to descend under VFR if the
engine failed. This was generally seen as an unsatisfactory rule. In
May 1998 regulations were further revised to expand SE operating
authority, provided additional maintenance and equipment requirements were
met. Many factors influenced the decision, including data showing the
Cessna C208 Caravan turboprop to have a high level of reliability,
Canada's positive experience with SE IFR, and a significant CFIT problem
in Alaska, particularly, as a result of continuing VFR flights into
deteriorating IMC conditions. In Alaska, pilots were filing for a VFR
commercial flight, aiming to stay below, or in the clear on top. Instead,
they ran into deteriorating weather conditions, pushed on to gain their
crust of bread, and ended their careers as a CFIT statistic. The situation
was rightly judged by the authorities as highly dangerous. The expanded SE
IFR authority was felt to provide a significantly higher level of safety. Today
there are some 50 countries worldwide that permit SE commercial IFR
operations, including a number approving cargo only operations in Europe.
The challenge in Europe is to agree a harmonised rule. To this end, in
1995 the JAA set up a working group, which put out an Advance-Notification
of Proposed Amendment (A-NPA), suggesting removal of the restriction on SE
commercial IFR operations, with a number of additional, and many maintain
impractical, operating conditions and minima. AECMA maintains these
proposals have been evolved from JAA ETOPS rules applicable to large
aircraft, and which are overdemanding. The
original working group discussions and proposals included approval for SE
IFR passenger operations, but this important detail appears to have got
"lost" in the mists of time. The WG requested comments on the A-NPA
from interested parties, including authorities, associations, operators
and manufacturers. Their replies have recently become available to
INTERAVIA. In
Europe the issue has been an emotive one for years. National certification
authorities have been divided into two camps, those that were prepared to
approve SE operations, and those that wouldn't consider it at any price.
The Scandinavians, and France, went for early approval, but restricted
operations to cargo only, while the British CAA, supported by the British
Airline Pilots association (BALPA), and the SBAC, remained ferociously
opposed. Today the British contingent finds itself in a minority of one. It
is perhaps worth noting that BALPA had been equally ferociously opposed to
the concept of ETOPS, where twin-engined airliners carrying hundreds of
passengers were expected to fly for up to 180 minutes on one engine
following failure of the other engine. Today ETOPS is an every day fact of
life. BALPA's case against SE IFR is focused on the possible consequences
on the ground of a forced landing at night in highly-populated Europe, the
difficulty of executing such a landing, and the need for more detailed
research. The UK CAA wants significant enhancements of systems integrity
and capability, operational limitations and pilot training before it could
reconsider its position. The SBAC position reflects the standpoint of
UK-based light twin manufacturer Britten-Norman. Until
recently, other authorities appeared content to follow the ICAO rule,
effectively getting themselves off the hook. The pressure for single-engined
commercial operations in Europe was minimal, since there was a plentiful
supply of late-model piston and turbine twins, and the turbine single had
not yet been invented. Today pressures of economics and competition are
threatening the survival of small transport and charter operators flying
now-elderly twins, and many are looking to the lower operating costs that
turbine singles offer. Additionally the supply of good, late-model piston
twins has long dried up. It
was just a year ago that we took an in-depth look at two popular utility
aircraft , Cessna's hugely successful Caravan workhorse, over
1000 of which are now in service, and the Pilatus PC12 (see INTERAVIA N.
622, July/August 1998, p. 33), which provides close to the performance and
capability of a King Air 200 twin turboprop on just one engine. On the
subject of the approval of these aircraft for SE commercial IFR
operations, we noted the compelling ICAO argument for "a fare-paying
passenger to have a right to the same safety level irrespective of what
aircraft he is travelling on". And we continued "and that can
clearly never be the case in a single-engined aircraft." We
reckon that we are going to be proved wrong. Following a considerable
lobbying effort, under the banner of the Single Engine Turboprop Alliance
(SETA), set up by manufacturers of single-engined turbine-powered
aircraft, including Cessna, Pilatus, Socata and Piper, and other
interested parties, the JAA is now forming a new working group to take
account of the comments received to the earlier A-NPA and come up with
recommendations. With the overwhelming level of support indicated, it
seems likely that SE commercial IFR operations across the EU will at last
become a reality , at least for cargo flights, initially, to
gain confidence levels. The
SETA lobby has built up a convincing case for the doubters, consulting
authorities, associations, small operators, distributors and manufacturers
across the world in its quest to change a mindset. According
to SETA the justification for SE IFR, at least for cargo initially, lies
in three major categories: the Safety case; the Commercial need; and
International harmonisation of rules. Wider issues include the approval of
the carriage of passengers in IFR, though certain authorities support the
carriage of passengers from Day One. The
Safety Case The
SETA proposal considers that the safety target for the operation of SE
aircraft at night or in IMC should clearly exceed what has been achieved
in recent years with small twins. It then points out that US, Canadian,
Australian and other authorities, and the JAA Working Group, have
demonstrated the ability to meet this target. Propulsion-related accidents
are a minority of total accident , under US FAR 135 operations
1981-1990, 18 percent. The perceived concern of single engine failure is
not the most significant contributory cause of accidents. Out of 28
accidents to Caravans, worldwide, in the period 1985-98, no fewer than 14
were due to CFIT. Surely that should be telling something to the pilot
licensing, rather than the certification, authorities? Accident
rate per 100,000 flight hours US
FAR 135 Scheduled
Service 1981-90 C208 1985-93 NTSB
1979 report ME
piston propulsion All causes related Propulsion related Propulsion related Accidents
1.21 0.22 0.30 1.70 Fatal
Accidents 0.30 0.06 0.07 0.41 In
Canada, in operations with 58 Caravans, 14 PC12s and 2 TBM700s and with a
fleet total since 1993 of approximately 175,000 hours, there have been two
major engine shutdown occurrences , one due to a failure to
install a fuel manifold locking plate in which the aircraft made a
successful return to the field, while the other involved a forced landing
in which there were no fatalities. The
Australian CAA study concluded that the single turbine was at least as
safe as the piston twin in regard to engine-failure related accidents, and
also stated that "forced landings at night are not necessarily as
hazardous as might be expected and are mostly survivable: the fatal
accident rate at night, while higher than by day, is only about 8
percent." The Australian CAA concluded that the probability of a
fatal accident due to engine failure on a single-engined turbine aircraft
was 0.07 per 100,000 hours, compared to "the best performing piston
twins" rate of 0.15 per 100,000 hours. That says you're at least
twice as safe in a turbine single as in a piston twin. UK
CAA analysis of fatal accidents to aircraft of less than 5,700kg
(12,500lb) on both private and commercial operations from 1985 to 1994
showed only 6 out of 166 (3.6 percent) were due to engine stoppage. The UK
data included 4 fatals to light twins due to loss of control following
engine failure or asymmetric power, compared to 9 fatals in single-engined
aircraft, based on a sample of 8 million flight hours. Taking into account
the probable number of hours of single and twin-engined aircraft in the
sample, this indicates a far higher frequency of powerplant-related fatal
accidents on twins than singles; (there are 7,500 singles on the UK
register compared to 350 light twins). Analysis
by Robert E. Breiling associates for Pilatus Aircraft concluded that
piston-engined general aviation aircraft were involved in 2.86 times more
accidents than turboprop aircraft per 100,000 flight hours, when
considering all causes. The
Swedish CAA study of the mid-1980s concluded that the fatal accident rate
for single-turboprops, due to engine failure, was estimated at 0.13 per
100,000 flight hours. The study concluded that operations with SE
turboprops are comparable with other commercial operations. Cessna
C208 Caravan fatals in the USA, 1985-1996 (2.6 million flight hours), were
0.56 per 100,000 hours; fatal accidents due to mechanical failures of the
engine were zero. Of the five non-fatal accidents involving engine failure
or shutdown, three occurred in 1990 and 1991 due to oil loss, because the
oil cap was left off or improperly installed; a modification has been
introduced to prevent such an occurrence. The remaining two were actual
engine mechanical failures (scavenge pump and gas producer turbine
failures). Contrary
to what one might imagine, 21.3 percent of accidents, and 20 percent of
fatals in twin piston-engined aircraft in US operations occurred following
engine malfunction or failure. In these cases, the accident occurred even
though one engine was still functioning normally , indicating
that the pilot was unable to control the aircraft following the engine
problem. The
SETA SE IFR proposals include requirements for enhanced onboard systems
and equipment, to make the pilot's job easier, better maintenance
programmes as well as operational limitations. Extra systems include dual
electrical power supplies, an emergency electrical supply, two attitude
indicators and engine health and usage monitoring. Crew training beyond
that required for today's twin licences is also suggested. Although the
regulations do not require it, some Norwegian operators have a policy of a
two-pilot crew for SE IFR, which would appear to be an eminently sensible,
if costly, solution. A
further argument in favour of the single engined aircraft is its low
stalling speed of 61 knots, imposed by long-standing certification
regulations, which ensures a low touchdown speed, short ground run, and
better survival probability in case of a forced landing. Commercial
need Light
piston twins designed in the 1960s and 70s are reaching the end of their
safe working lives. Many operators make the point that performance of
these aircraft on one engine at MGTOW has always been marginal; in
difficult weather conditions, or at night, following engine failure, a
high degree of piloting skill may be required to survive. Certain designs
of the period had very limited, or even negative, climb capabilities on
one engine. Systems, autopilots and avionics have become unreliable, and
designed to lower standards than would be acceptable today, particularly
in safety-critical areas; parts are hard to get and expensive, and
safety-related repairs are far more frequently needed. There
is a compelling safety and economic case to replace the old clunkers with
modern and reliable designs, represented by the new generation of
turbine-powered singles. As one operator puts it: "we continue to fly
on recycled junk." The market replacement need in Europe alone is
huge, and could be served by Europe-based manufacturers Pilatus and Socata,
to the benefit of the European aerospace industry, and by US-based Cessna
and Piper. Undoubtedly, following operating approval, other designs would
enter the market, further stimulating the general aviation sector. Small
outlying communities worldwide are coming to rely on air services for
supplies, medical and other vital services, which today are provided at
considerably higher risk levels by outdated piston twins. Is this really
the intention of authorities that oppose approval of SE IFR operations?
The SE turboprop would provide a higher level of safety and reliability,
and be more economic to operate. As experience levels build up,
reliability of the SE turboprop is likely to further increase. Harmonisation
of rules The
FAA and JAA agree on the need to harmonise regulations to create a
consistently safe, seamless, worldwide transportation system. Clearly it
is unsatisfactory for a tourist, for example, to take an IFR flight in a
SE turboprop to a remote holiday destination, and then learn that such
operations are considered unsafe by his home authority. This is the
situation today. There
appears to be a misconception, notes the SETA document, that SE IFR is
fine in the USA because the terrain and weather conditions are much more
forgiving than in Europe. This conception is totally false, and in fact
the weather in the US is far worse than in Europe in many areas. There are
also numerous mountain ranges in the US, while population densities in the
USA in many areas are similar to Europe. Concern
about little aeroplanes falling on people's heads are equally unfounded , after all there are over 7,000 privately-owned singles in
congested Germany alone, which can and do fly practically everywhere in
IFR and VFR conditions, and they do not fall on people's heads. Experience
in the USA, and elsewhere, has demonstrated that SE IFR in turboprop
aircraft is safe. The bottom line is that a multi-engine piston operator
has a higher probability of accident and fatality compared to the single
turbine operator. This alone is reason enough to approve single turbine
commercial IFR operations , for both passenger and cargo
flights. SIDE
STORY: Engine Condition Trend Monitoring ECTM,
developed by Pratt & Whitney Canada, is essentially a three part
process: 1.
In-flight data may be gathered by the pilot or by an automatic recorder.
Accuracy of the data is dependent upon the accuracy of the readings taken
and recorded. Data includes compressor speed, torque, IAS, prop speed,
inter-turbine temperature, fuel flow, indicated outside air temperature
and pressure altitude. 2.
The data is mathematically converted to ISA conditions SL, and compared to
a mominal engine model to produce deltas, which can be viewed on screen or
printed. 3.
Analysis of the trends forms the basis for the "on-condition HSI"
concept of hot section inspections, and for other maintenance. The
use of ECTM will increase safety, decrease HSI cost, reduce down time and
minimize flight aborts, maintains Danish Engine Trend Analyzing (DETA),
which currently "keeps an eye on the trend" of some 25 aircraft.
Engines covered include the PT6, PW100, PW300, PW500 and the JT15D series.
Single-
and twin-turbine accident rates similar by
Gordon Gilbert In
the aftermath of July's well publicized engine-out ditching of a Pilatus
PC-12 in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Russia, industry observers are
asking how this and other recent accidents have affected the statistical
reliability of single-engine turboprops and if sales of these aircraft are
suffering. Although
production-built single-turbine airplanes used for business flying
typically do not have the same speed, load capability or systems
redundancy as twin-turbine airplanes, they have amassed a comparable
safety record, according to statistics through last year compiled by
accident analyst firm Robert E. Breiling Associates of Boca Raton, Fla. Breiling
reports U.S. turboprop-singles have had 1.99 total accidents and 0.80
fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hr compared with 2.37 and 0.83,
respectively, for U.S.-registered turboprop twins. These figures cover the
period from initial aircraft certification through last year. Last year
the statistical reliability of single-engine turboprops was even played up
by Pilatus in its marketing of the PC-12. While
accident rate statistics seem to back up that claim, the actual number of
single-engine turboprop accidents is increasing as the fleet gets larger.
This year to date, the NTSB reports that there have been 10 accidents,
five of them fatal, involving four production-certified single-engine
turboprops: the Cessna 208 Caravan, Piper PA-46-500TP Meridian, Socata TBM
700 and Pilatus PC-12. Nine
of the 10 accidents are still under investigation, seven of the accidents
were in Cessna 208s (by far the most numerous of all turboprop singles,
with close to 1,300 in operation), and engine failure has definitely been
determined as a factor in four accidents, (April 26, July 6, July 8 and
July 10) none causing critical injuries. The Safety Board determined the
January 31 crash of the Cessna 208 on floats was caused when the airplane
hit a swell during a water landing. All production turboprop singles are
powered by the Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6 series. Engine
Problems A
Caravan flying for FedEx made a forced landing April 26 after an engine
failure. The pilot (not injured in the accident) said that during climbout
the airplane's engine "spooled down, slowly and smoothly, like a loss
of torque or the propeller going to feather." Later, an examination
of data from the power analyzer recorder system revealed that during the
most recent takeoff the engine exceeded its torque limit of 1,980 ft lb
for 99 seconds. The peak torque value over that duration was 2,649 ft lb. On
July 6, a Caravan on a repositioning flight operated by Maxfly Aviation
ditched into the Atlantic Ocean 20 mi east of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.,
following loss of engine power. According to the pilot (who was not hurt),
the airplane was cruising at 6,500 ft when the engine lost power and came
to a "screeching halt." The propeller made a "chow, chow,
chow" noise, turned three times, stopped and feathered. In
the July 8 PC-12 ditching, the pilot reported that the airplane was in
cruise at 26,500 ft when he felt a vibration followed by a rapid increase
in the engine's turbine temperature indication (TTI). He reported that the
TTI reached 1,144 deg C, at which point there was a compressor stall. He
shut down the engine, feathered the propeller and entered a power-off
emergency descent. After spending 15 hr in a life raft, the pilot and all
three passengers were safely recovered some 60 mi from the Russian coast
in the icy Sea of Okhotsk. Two
days later, on July 10, a Cessna 208 of Bolivian registration (CP-2395),
was substantially damaged during a forced landing following a loss of
engine power during climbout from the La Paz International Airport in
Bolivia. The pilot, the copilot and 11 passengers were injured. The flight
crew reported a loss of engine power approximately six minutes after
takeoff. In
the U.S., more than 70 percent of PC-12 sales are to owner-pilots for
personal and business flying. As might be expected, just the opposite is
true for the Caravan, where 70 percent of its users are small package
commercial operators, according to director of Caravan sales for Cessna
John Doman. "In our experience with the Caravan,which has
more than 15 years of service under its belt, flying in all sorts of
different conditions,it has established an enviable safety
record. The PT6 is a legendary powerplant in terms of reliability. So our
reaction from the marketplace is one of acceptance of the safety inherent
in the turbine single." A
lot of Caravan air-freight customers are moving up from piston twins such
as Beech 18s, Queen Airs, Navajos and Cessna 402s. "Statistics and
just common knowledge tell you that a single-turbine airplane is going to
be a safer, more reliable piece of machinery than the piston twin,"
Doman said. Doman
said Cessna does not actively market the Caravan to the U.S. air-taxi
industry. He described that position as a "corporate decision,"
not based on any accident or incident history. The airplane by regulation
is permitted to fly air taxi, including carrying fare-paying passengers in
IMC, but Doman said Cessna over the years has become "very
sensitive" to product liability in the U.S. There
are many air-taxi Caravans in operation outside the U.S., "But if
someone were to come to us for a new Caravan for flying paying passengers
between Chicago and Minneapolis, we would respectfully decline the
sale." Overseas, however, Cessna encourages sales to this market. And
that market potential is just waiting for some promised rulemaking relief. For
the last five years Cessna has been working with other airframe
manufacturers as a member of the Single Engine Turbine Alliance (SETA) to
get the JAA to change the requirements in Europe to allow single-turbine
IFR commercial operations. Such operations are currently prohibited for
both carrying cargo and fare-paying passengers. "We think that the
way things are headed, we should see a change by perhaps the end of this
year," Doman said. A
spokesman for Piper Aircraft in Vero Beach, Fla., echoed the statements on
the quality, excellence, reliability and safety perceived by prospective
and new owners of single turboprop airplanes. Indeed, P&WC statistics
show the time between unplanned removals for the PT6 family as occurring
once in every 142,817.14 hr and the time between in-flight shutdowns to be
one in every 250,000 hr. Aviation
International News is a publication of The Convention News Co., Inc., P.O.
Box 277, Midland Park, NJ, 07432. Copyright 2001. All rights reserved.
Reproduction in whole or in part without permission from The Convention
News Co., Inc., is strictly prohibited. The Convention News Co., Inc.,
also publishes NBAA Convention News, HAI Convention News, EBACE Convention
News, Paris 2003, Dubai 2001, Asian Aerospace 2002, Farnborough 2002, AIN
Reports and AIN News Alerts. The
following safety information is summarized from the contents of a report
prepared by: ROBERT
E. BREILING ASSOCIATES, INC. 765
N.E. 35th Street, Suite B Boca
Raton, FL 33431 (561)
338-6900 SINGLE
TURBOPROP POWERPLANT AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY For
PILATUS BUSINESS AIRCRAFT LTD. August
2000 Summary/Findings Powerplant
Reliability Comparative Data - Five Year Average. 1992-1996 (Data is based
on information available from NTSB and FAA sources). Accidents
per 100,000 hours by major aircraft type, 5 year average 1992-1996 Single
engine reciprocating powered aircraft 9.26 Multi-engine
reciprocating powered aircraft 5.68 Multi-engine
turboprop powered aircraft 4.34 Single
engine turboprop aircraft 1.46 Percent
of general aviation fixed wing aircraft accidents attributed to power loss
- all causes - 5 year average, 1992-1996 Single
engine reciprocating powered aircraft 33.5% Multi-engine
reciprocating powered aircraft 27.6% Multi-engine
turboprop powered aircraft 8.0% Single
engine turboprop aircraft 0% Percent of general aviation fixed wing aircraft accidents attributed to power loss due to mechanical, maintenance, design, manufacturer causes Single
engine reciprocating powered aircraft 14.4% Multi-engine
reciprocating powered aircraft 8.9% Multi-engine
turboprop powered aircraft 4.0% Single
engine turboprop aircraft 0% Accidents
per 100,000 hours due to power loss for
mechanical/maintenance/design/manufacturer (based on Commercial and Air
Carrier operation data compiled by the FAA) Single
engine reciprocating powered aircraft 1.33 Multi-engine
reciprocating powered aircraft 0.51 Multi-engine
turboprop powered aircraft 0.17 S/E
turboprop aircraft excluding agricultural aircraft 0 Powerplant
shutdowns per 1,000 hours (Commercial/Air Carrier data) Average of
selected powerplants, 1997 Reciprocating
powerplant average 0.208 Turboprop
powerplant average 0.041 Selected
Aircraft Accident Analysis - Certification through 1999 - U.S. Fleet Piper
Malibu(sic) Cessna Caravan Socata TBM700 Pilatus PC-12 Certification
Date 1983 1984 1988 1994 U.S.
Fleet Size 749 821 74 133 Accidents
79 59 5 1 Fatal
Accidents 25 27 1 0 Accidents
due to powerplant malfunction
/ failure 14 2 0 0 Cumulative
flight hours
1,100,150 3,145,272 161,406 134,234 Accident
rate per
100,000 hrs. 7.18 1.88 3.10 0.74 Fatal
Accident rate per
100,000 hrs. 2.27 0.86 0.62 0 Power
loss accident rate per
100,000 hrs. 1.27 0.064 0 0 *1
non-U.S. registered PC-12 experienced an accident due to powerplant loss
due to mechanical malfunction / failure Conclusions: Based
on the review and analysis of accident data involving multi and single
reciprocating and turboprop powerplant malfunction / failure accidents and
analysis of the various powerplant reliability data available, a single
turboprop powered aircraft, with adequate backup systems provided in it's
design, will be more reliable, involved in fewer powerplant malfunction /
failure related accidents than that of single or multi reciprocating
powered fixed wing aircraft and comparable to the reliability of a
multi-turboprop powered aircraft.
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